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Statement of claim; submitted with a digital
signature (qualified electronic signature);
certificate; monetary limit; validity of signature
Electronically signed claim – on the interpretation of the
term monetary limitation
Decision of the Finance Court of Münster dated
23.03.2006 annulled, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review 3 (2006) 111 - 112 (previously the
Digital Evidence Journal 2006 (3)(2) 121 (Summary and
comment))
Summary of the decision
The plaintiff’s counsel filed a statement of claim along
with other documents via e-mail in a ‘container’ with a
qualified electronic signature pursuant to the German
Signature Act (Signaturgesetz). The corresponding
signature certificate contained a monetary limitation of
100 euros. The plaintiff argued that the qualified
electronic signature is valid because the monetary
limitation in the signature certificate only applies to the
conclusion of contracts, and not to any other declaration
signed with the corresponding qualified electronic
signature. The Finance Court of Münster dismissed the
claim and judged that the claim had not been filed in
writing or in an equivalent form, and had, in particular,
not been signed with a valid electronic signature,
because filing an action with the Financial Court causes
financial consequences exceeding the monetary
limitation of 100 euros.
The plaintiff filed an appeal with the Federal Finance
Court (Bundesfinanzhof –BFH).
The BFH annulled the decision of the Finance Court. The
BFH pointed out that according to its legal nature, the
electronic signature is an equivalent to the manuscript
signature. According to Section 52a FGO
(Finanzgerichtsordnung – Statues of the German
Finance Courts) – which replaced the former Section 77a
FGO, electronically signed documents can be submitted
to the Financial Courts.
The BFH explains that monetary limitations only refer
to financial transactions, that is bank transfers or other
money transactions. In accordance with this function, a
monetary limitation is irrelevant if the electronic
signature is used to submit a written pleading to the
court. In such a case, only the evidence of the
authorship is relevant because it is not a financial
transaction. The monetary limitation as no meaning in
this context and the signature serves its purpose to
ensure the authenticity of the document.
Comment
This decision clarifies the confusion and uncertainty of
lawyers using qualified electronic signatures with
monetary limitations. It emphasises the function and
importance of electronic signatures in their
communication with the courts and brings a positive
end to a discussion that caused unjustified scepticism
towards electronic signatures.
© Dr. Martin Eßer, 2009
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The judgment is available in German at:
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidun
gen/cs20090303_2bvc000307.html
A press release in English, Press release no. 19/2009 of
3 March 2009, is available at http://www.bverfg.de/en/
press/bvg09-019en.html
Unconstitutional use of electronic voting
machines
Facts
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany gave a
judgment on 3 March 2009 which defines the primary
requirements relating to electronic voting. The court
rendered its judgment on two complaints concerning
the scrutiny of the 16th German Bundestag election of
2005. These complaints were directed against the use of
computer-controlled voting machines within the election
at hand. The use of these machines is permitted under
German law by Sec. 35 of the Federal Electoral Act
(Bundeswahlgesetz – BWG). The court decided that the
present function of the voting machines and their use
violates the principle of the public nature of elections
(Article 38 in conjunction with Article 20.1 and 20.2 of
the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany
(Grundgesetz – GG), which prescribes that all essential
steps of an election are subject to the possibility of
public scrutiny unless other constitutional interests
justify an exception.
Commentary 
The court decided that due to the wide-reaching effect
of possible errors of the voting machines or of
deliberate electoral fraud, special precautions are
necessary in order to safeguard the principle of the
public nature of elections. For this reason, voting
machines have to enable citizens to examine the
essential steps of the voting procedure and of the
determination of the result in a reliable way and without
any special IT knowledge. This decision means that this
requirement must also be met by any electronic voting
system, irrespective of the mode of use (with or without
voting machines) in order to be in accordance with the
Basic Law.
Furthermore, in the case at hand, the court found that
the calculation process that was carried out in the
voting machines, and the fact that the voting results
were noted down merely by means of a summarising
printout, did not correspond to the principle of the
public nature of elections. According to the judgment of
this Constitutional Court decision, electronic voting
machines should enable a reliable examination and
provide an insight into the accuracy of the voting result.
An example to resolve such a problem would for an
electronic voting machine, for instance, in which the
votes are recorded in more than one way, other than the
electronic storage of the machine, thus enabling a
complementary examination by the voter, the electoral
bodies or the general public. It goes without saying that
printing the ballots is only one possible way of
implementing this prerequisite.
The court also pointed out that the right of citizens to
examine the voting procedure and the voting result
cannot be replaced by a public authority which
examines sample machines in the context of their
engineering type and issues a license permitting their
use for elections. The trust in the accuracy of an
appraisal and an auditing procedure of a public
authority cannot be a substitute for the trust in the
voting procedure. The court did not go into the question
of how a trust mechanism on complex IT based
procedures can be generated.
The court concluded that the Federal Voting Machines
Ordinance ((Bundeswahlgeräteverordnung - BWahlGV)
vom 3. September 1975 (Bundesgesetzblatt I Seite
2459) (in der Fassung der Verordnung zur Änderung der
Bundeswahlgeräteverordnung und der
Europawahlordnung vom 20. April 1999
(Bundesgesetzblatt I Seite 749)) (Federal Voting
Machines Ordinance - BWahlGV) dated September 3,
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1975 (Federal Law Gazette I page 2459) as amended by
Council Regulation amending Regulation Equipment
Federal Election and the European Regulations from
April 20, 1999 (Federal Law Gazette I, page 749)) is
unconstitutional, because it does not ensure that only
voting machines which meet the above mentioned
constitutional requirements are permitted and used.
However, because of the lack of any indications that the
voting machines malfunctioned or could have been
manipulated and in order to protect the continued
existence of the elected parliament, the court decided
that this decision does not result in the dissolution of
the Bundestag.
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